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TOUGH ATTITUDE INSURES PEACE

In contrast to the soft line taken on Communism by U.S. State Department, some other authorities within the government long have warned, and continue to warn, that appearance of softness by this country encourages Communism to risk adventures that might lead to war.

It should be encouraging to most Americans that there are still officials in the government who see the strength of the United States, in materiel and in attitude, as the only way to protect our nation and keep the peace of the world. Thus this country's safety will depend on which set of experts the president, whoever he may be, chooses to listen to.

Even as the tippy-toed policies of the State Department continue to be pressed upon the White House, others, including the military and intelligence agencies, submit to the president much more hard-boiled and clear-minded recommendations. An example the other day was a Central Intelligence Agency report on the risk of nuclear war. As reported by Ray Cromley, Newspaper Enterprise Association columnist, here is the gist of the report:

WASHINGTON (NEA) — A Central Intelligence Agency atudy seems to conclude the greatest risk of nuclear war in the years ahead may come from U.S. actions which convince Soviet leaders we lack determination in a crisis.

The study, by Willard Matthias of the CIA Board of National

Estimates, says:

"While it is most unlikely that Soviet leaders will choose to carry out actions they know to carry a high risk of general war, such knowledge is not easy to come by...

"In this age of mobile striking forces and hardened missile sites, it does not appear possible to build a nuclear force capable of destroying an enemy's capabilities and simultaneously protecting oneself

"Even extremely large numbers of high-cost weapons would provide no assurance of victory or even survival. Thus, if there is any valid and rational concept today upon which to develop

or measure a strategic military force, it is that of deterrence.
"But one cannot find any rule for determining that a stated level of force will deter and that another will not." Deterrence dopends, says Matthias, in very considerable measure on how the enemy sizes up the determination and will of his opponent.

The Matthias study gives an example—how the United States, by seeming to be afraid of a confrontation, set the stage for the Cuban missile crisis of 1962.

Says this CIA paper:
"In the international atmosphere of early 1962, when the Cuhan move was planned, the Soviet leaders were still riding high and the United States probably appeared to them to be

uncertain and cautious.

"The United States had chosen not to run the political risks necessary to save the Bay of Pigs expedition. The United States had accepted the erection of the Berlin Wall with little more than verbal pyrotechnics. And the United States had accepted the neutralist solution in Laos.

"Formal U.S. Statements regarding Cuba conveyed an air of

studied uncertainty.

'In military planning, despite substantially increased procrams of missile deployment, the United States was advocating a greater conventional capability and a counter-insurgency

program "Thus, it probably appeared to the Soviets that the diplomatic and military stance of the United States was that of a power seeking to avoid confrontation and fearful of its consequences, and therefore a power which could be subjected to a series of setbacks without high risks of forceful resistance.

The U.S. show of determination in the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 convinced Soviet leaders we did mean business, Matthias says. He thinks that will stand the United States in good stead for a little while.

But he says there will be other times and places in which Soviet leaders could again read a lack of will power in U.S. ac-

tions. This could lead to trouble.

This study has the "general approval" of the CIA Board of National Estimates, "though no attempt has been made to reach complete agreement on every point."